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Abstract 
 
This paper presents some new evidence on the conflict of interest that may arise 
when banks underwrite corporate securities and sell them to their customers. Two 
alternative views are confronted: a) that commercial banks possess private 
information on the financial condition of their clients and so perform better screening 
(the certification hypothesis); and b) that commercial banks might convert loans to 
firms in financial difficulties into bonds marketed to unsuspecting clients (the ‘naïve 
investor’ hypothesis). The empirical analysis compares the default rates between 
2000 and 2002 of a sample of more than 5,000 securities issued from 1991 to 1999. 
Our results show that, on average, securities underwritten by investment houses and 
by commercial banks had the same probability of default. However, investment-grade 
issues underwritten by commercial banks had a lower probability of default than 
those underwritten by investment houses, while the reverse was true for non-
investment-grade issues. Based on this latter result, it is not possible to refute the 
‘naïve investor’ hypothesis, as instead in Kroszner and Rajan (1994). 
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1 Introduction 
One of the main undesirable features of information asymmetries is the potential for 
conflicts of interest. Two recent events have brought the issue to the attention of 
academics, policymakers and the general public. The first was the repeal, with the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which for nearly 
70 years had banned U.S. commercial banks from the business of underwriting 
corporate securities. The rationale for the Glass-Steagall Act was to eliminate the 
conflict of interest inherent in the possibility that banks might convert loans to firms 
in financial distress into securities to be sold to ‘naive’ clients. The second event that 
brought conflicts of interest to the fore was the collapse in stock market prices at the 
turn of the century and the following surge in corporate scandals.   
A recent report produced jointly by the International Center for Monetary and 
Banking Studies and the Centre for Economic and Policy Research defines conflicts 
of interest in the financial sector as arising “when a financial service provider, or an 
agent within such a service provider, has multiple interests which create incentives to 
act in such a way to misuse or conceal information needed for the effective 
functioning of financial markets” (Crockett et al., 2003, p. 5). The report draws 
attention to four major areas of potential conflicts of interest: underwriting and 
brokerage, auditing and consulting, credit assessment and consulting, and universal 
banking. Each of these issues has been analyzed extensively by academics and policy 
makers alike.1  
In this paper we present some new empirical evidence on the potential 
conflicts of interest, focusing on the problem of banks underwriting corporate 
securities and selling them to their customers. With respect to the taxonomy set out 
                                                     
1 Crockett et al. (2003) offers a very a rich and rigorous discussion of the literature analyzing 
conflicts of interests in financial markets and puts forward some quite bold policy 
prescriptions.  
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above, such a conflict is similar to that arising when the same agent acts as both 
underwriter and financial consultant, and is therefore potentially relevant even when 
investment banking is separated from commercial banking. However, the strength of 
the Glass-Steagall prescriptions and the Act’s long duration reveal this conflict of 
interest is perceived to be drastically more severe when commercial banks are 
involved. Such a distinction between investment and commercial banks implicitly 
suggests that they have different clienteles, who may deserve different degrees of 
protection. The rationale for banning commercial banks from the underwriting 
business is in fact to be found in the need to protect their clients, who are presumed 
to be less able to evaluate the quality of securities issues. This is what Kroszner and 
Rajan (1994) call the ‘naïve investors’ hypothesis. A contrary thesis is that the banks 
are better informed than investment houses on the financial conditions of their clients 
and are thus able to provide better certification of the securities that they underwrite. 
Recent empirical studies show that in the pre-Glass-Steagall period securities 
underwritten by commercial banks had lower probability of default and lower interest 
rates and that those underwritten after 1987 by Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial 
banks also had lower interest rates.2 These results are consistent with two hypotheses, 
not mutually exclusive. One is that markets are aware of the potential conflicts of 
interest, thus obliging commercial banks to underwrite only high-quality corporate 
securities; the second is that investors recognize the stronger certification ability of 
commercial banks. What is still missing in the literature, to our knowledge, is a 
comparison of the rates of default on securities issued by investment houses and by 
commercial banks in the Nineties. This is what we provide in this paper. 
Our empirical results shed some new light on conflicts of interest in the 
underwriting business. We examine more than 5,000 securities issues underwritten 
                                                     
2 During the Nineties, a number of studies compared the characteristics of securities 
underwritten by commercial and by investment banks, respectively. A brief discussion is 
presented in section 2; a richer survey is in Crockett et al. (2003). 
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by investment houses and commercial banks between 1991 and 1999. We find that 
investment-grade issues underwritten by commercial banks had a lower probability of 
default than those underwritten by investment houses, but the reverse was true for 
non-investment-grade issues. Based on these results it is not possible to reject the 
‘naïve investor’ hypothesis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the institutional 
environment in the U.S. market for corporate securities underwriting since the 
introduction of Section 20 subsidiaries. Sections 3 and 4 survey the results of the 
literature and describe the hypotheses under investigation. Section 5 describes the 
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the results of the econometric 
analysis. Section 7 provides some interpretation and presents some additional 
robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2 The institutional framework 
The stock market boom of the late 1920s generated a surge in IPOs, and commercial 
banks swarmed into the securities underwriting business. The uncertain legal status 
of the bond departments of national banks was clarified by the McFadden Act in 
1927, which expressly allowed them to underwrite securities (Peach, 1941), with a 
similar organization to that established in the Nineties for Section 20 subsidiaries 
(Crockett et al., 2003). 
The public outcry following the stock market crash of 1929 prompted a Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee inquiry known as the Pecora hearings,3 to ascertain 
whether commercial banks had sold unsound securities to their customers, thus 
converting potential bad loans into security issues. The results were cited by 
advocates of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited “commercial banks 
                                                     
3 Ferdinand Pecora was legal adviser to the Senate sub-commission investigating conflicts of 
interest. 
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from underwriting, holding or dealing in corporate securities, either directly or 
through securities affiliates” (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994, p. 810).4 In particular, 
Section 20 of the Act ordered that “no member bank could be affiliated with any 
corporation, association or business trust engaged principally in the issue, flotation, 
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail through syndicate 
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities”.5  
Between 1933 and 1963 Glass-Steagal was fully enforced by the Fed (Cornett 
et al., 2002). Starting in the mid-1960s, however, banks went back to the security 
business, and eventually gained court authorization to underwrite municipal bonds, 
commercial paper and mortgage backed securities. 
The progressive increase in competition from financial markets abroad 
prompted the Fed, in April 1987, to allow U.S. commercial bank holding companies 
to establish affiliates under Section 20 authorized to underwrite corporate securities. 
Two years later these affiliates were allowed to underwrite commercial paper and 
corporate debt; in 1990 permission was extended to equities. All these activities were 
allowed as long as they did not generate more than 5 per cent of the bank’s total 
revenues (the ceiling was raised to 10 per cent in 1989 and 25 per cent in 1996). A 
further erosion of the Glass-Steagall restrictions came in 1997, when bank holding 
companies were allowed to simply buy investment houses as Section 20 subsidiaries, 
without having to establish them. 
Finally, in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization 
Act repealed the legal barriers between commercial banks, investment houses and 
insurance companies. 
                                                     
4 The recent literature (starting from the seminal paper by Kroszner and Rajan, 1994) has 
pointed out that the examples provided in the congressional hearings were strongly biased 
against the behavior of commercial banks (see also Crockett et al., 2003). For an opposite 
position see, among others, Carosso (1970). 
5 For a careful analysis if the institutional environment in the pre-Glass-Steagall period see 
Peach (1941), Carosso (1970) and Benston (1990). 
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3 The literature  
The progressive loosening of the Glass-Steagall constraints and the policy debate that 
led to its repeal generated a number of empirical studies analyzing the pros and cons 
of the separation between commercial banks and investment houses. Two main 
hypotheses were scrutinized. Bank underwritten securities might be riskier, because 
of the conflict of interest between lending and underwriting. Alternatively, they could 
be safer, because lending banks might be better informed on their clients than 
investment houses and thus offer more credible certification.6 
The empirical studies can be divided into two major categories: those studying 
the pre-Glass-Steagall era and those analyzing the behavior of investment houses and 
Section 20 subsidiaries since the 1987 reform. 
In a seminal paper, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) study the characteristics of a 
sample of industrial bonds underwritten by affiliates of commercial banks and 
investment houses in the first quarters of the years between 1921 and 1929. They 
obtain two major findings. First, the bonds originated by affiliates were ex-ante safer 
– they had better ratings – which shows that markets were aware of potential 
conflicts of interest and responded by imposing a ‘lemons market’ discount on more 
information-intensive issues, so that commercial banks could underwrite almost 
exclusively safer securities. Second, non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by 
commercial banks affiliates had fewer cumulative defaults in the period 1930-1940, 
both in number and in total value, and investment-bank underwritten bonds defaulted 
earlier in their life than affiliate-originated issues. The evidence thus tells against the 
thesis that commercial banks were systematically defrauding their clients and 
disposing of bad loans.  
                                                     
6 Theoretical studies are fewer. A major exception is Puri (1999). 
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Puri (1994) and Ang and Richardson (1994) refine the analysis of Kroszner 
and Rajan (1994) and strengthen their results. Puri takes a narrower definition of 
issues underwritten by affiliates of commercial banks and concentrates on the period 
subsequent to the McFadden Act of 1927, which explicitly allowed affiliates to 
underwrite corporate securities, and confirms that affiliate-originated issues have a 
lower probability of default.7 Ang and Richardson (1994), considering a wider set of 
risk measures (ex-ante yield, default experience, ex-post market prices of bonds, 
stock prices of issuing companies), confirm that there is no evidence that issues 
underwritten by commercial bank security affiliates performed worse than those 
underwritten by investment houses. 
Puri (1996) provides further evidence for the hypothesis that markets are aware 
of the potential conflicts that should require a ‘lemons market’ discount, but that they 
also consider the positive effect of better information. Comparing two samples of 
securities underwritten in the pre-Glass-Steagall period, she finds that on average 
those originated by investment houses carry higher yields, confirming that 
commercial banks’ greater certification ability outweighs the ‘lemon’ discount.  
An alternative explanation of Puri’s evidence is that commercial banks have 
greater market power relative to their less sophisticated clientele, and so can place 
securities at lower prices than investment houses. But this is at odds with the finding 
of Kroszner and Rajan (1997) that securities issued by internal departments of 
commercial banks, for which the potential conflict of interest is even more severe, 
carry higher interest rates than those underwritten by securities affiliates. By 
confirming that markets consider an affiliate structure as an effective commitment 
mechanism, this result provides indirect evidence of the market’s ability to discern – 
and price – even the slightest possibility of conflicts of interest. 
                                                     
7 Kroszner and Rajan (1994) define bond issues as underwritten by commercial banks when 
any such institution is included in the syndicate. Puri (1994) includes only those where the 
affiliate is sole or lead underwriter.  
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Studying the Section-20 period, Gande et al. (1997) find clear evidence in 
favor of the certification hypothesis; securities underwritten by Section 20 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies have lower interest rates, and more markedly 
so for lower-rated issuers.8 Moreover, commercial banks tend to underwrite smaller 
issues, offering further indirect confirmation of their greater ability to acquire and 
process information.9 
Additional evidence is provided by analysis of different markets and 
countries.10 Studying the industrial revenue bond market, Saunders and Stover (2004) 
find that when commercial banks act either as underwriters or as credit guarantors, 
interest rate spreads to the issuers can even be larger than average; only when the 
same bank offers both services jointly are spreads narrower, consistent with a limited 
‘certification effect’ of commercial bank underwriting.  Studying the Canadian 
corporate bond market, Hebb and Fraser (2002) show that yields on issues 
underwritten by commercial bank affiliates are lower than those on issues originated 
by independent investment banks, suggesting that any conflict-of-interest effect is 
dominated by the ‘certification effect’. In Japan, before the Second World War when 
commercial and investment banking were not separated, Konishi (2002) finds no 
differences in the initial yields in bonds underwritten by commercial banks and 
investment houses, but lower default rates for the former. Gompers and Lerner 
(1999) show that IPOs of investment houses that hold stakes in issuing firms through 
a venture capital subsidiary are less information-sensitive but show equal or better 
                                                     
8 Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find little evidence of differences in the yield spreads between 
bonds underwritten by commercial banks and investment banks between 1995 and 1998. 
9 Gande et al. (1999) provide further evidence on the effects of the entry of Section 20 
subsidiaries in the security underwriting market, showing that they have favored the reduction 
of underwriter spreads and ex-ante yields, and proportionally more so for lower-rated and 
smaller issues. 
10 A parallel strand of literature has studied the effects of the introduction of Section 20 
subsidiaries on bank risk and profitability. Cornett et al. (2002) show that pre-tax cash flow 
performance of bank holding companies improves significantly in the three years after they 
establish a Section 20 subsidiary and that their overall riskiness is unchanged.  
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ex-post performance than IPOs underwritten by investment houses with no 
participations; again, this confirms the hypothesis that the market is aware of 
potential conflicts of interest and neutralizes the effects. Ber et al. (2000), studying 
IPOs in Israel, find that issuing firms whose equity was underwritten by a 
commercial bank affiliate had worse stock market performance but better accounting 
profitability. Drucker and Puri (2004) show that when an underwriter lends to an 
issuer around the time of an IPO (a practice known as ‘tying’), the firm obtains a 
discounted interest rate on the loan, and that the discount is greater for the more 
information-sensitive non-investment-grade issues; this is consistent with a 
certification effect.11 
4 Empirical methodology 
Our basic empirical model replicates Kroszner and Rajan (1994), verifying whether 
securities underwritten by commercial banks have a higher ex-post probability of 
default than those underwritten by investment houses. We estimate the following 
binary choice model, using a logistic specification: 
Pr (Yijt = k) = f (Xit,Dj,Tt), k = 0, 1;  (1) 
where: Yijt  = 1 if security issue i underwritten by bank j at time t defaulted before 
maturity and Yijt = 0 otherwise; Xit are characteristics of the issue i at time t (i.e., size, 
rating, maturity, gross spread over benchmark, issuer’s sector of economic activity); 
Dj is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is at least one Section 20 subsidiary 
among the banks leading the underwriting syndicate; Tt are year dummies. Unlike 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994), we also include information on the issue’s gross spread. 
                                                     
11 A related issue is studied by Narayanan et al. (2004), who show that, in order to signal that 
they are not willing to exploit potential conflicts of interest to their advantage, banks acting as 
underwriters to their clients predominantly co-manage with a high reputation non-lending 
institution. 
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All standard errors are calculated using the procedure of White (1980) to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and taking into account that bonds issued by the same borrower 
are not independent observations. 
In order to check the robustness of the results of the basic specification, we 
also adopt two additional specifications. First, in order to account more carefully for 
the different duration of the bonds included in our sample, we estimate a survival-
time data model by the method of proportional hazards regression first proposed by 
Cox (1972): 
( ) ( ) ( )iDxi tet ii 0' λλ γβ +−=    (2) 
where: λ0 is the ‘baseline’ hazard and Xi are characteristics of the issue i (i.e., size, 
rating, maturity, gross spread over benchmark, issuer’s sector of economic activity) 
affecting hazard rate and Di is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is at least one 
Section 20 subsidiary among the banks leading the underwriting syndicate.  
Second, in order to correct for the bias induced by the use of a parametric 
specification of the relationship between the probability of default and the type of 
subscribing bank, we adopt a propensity score matching method (Rubin, 1979).12 In 
practice, we split our sample between bonds underwritten by commercial banks 
(‘treated’ observations) and bonds underwritten by investment banks (‘untreated’ or 
‘control’ observations), match each ‘treated’ observation with a set of ‘untreated’ 
observations (chosen so as to be as similar as possible to the ‘untreated’ ones), and 
finally compare the probability of default between the two groups. More formally, 
defining PDI as the probability of default of bonds underwritten by investment banks, 
                                                     
12 These methods, first introduced in the medical sciences, are now becoming increasingly 
popular also in economics. They lend themselves naturally to our analysis, because they focus 
precisely on non-random selection. For a recent survey, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). 
The routine we used for estimations is PSMATCH2, a Stata module by Leuven and Sianesi. 
(2003).   
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PDS that of bonds underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries and X a set of 
characteristics of each bond, this procedure amounts at estimating: 
α  ≡ E [Pr(DI ) – Pr(DS)| X]   (3) 
5 Data and summary statistics 
Data on bond issues are from SDC, a dataset on securities issues that gives, among 
other information, date of issuance, yield to maturity, credit rating, size, maturity and 
issuer’s sector of economic activity. It is compiled from regulatory filings, news 
sources, company press releases, and prospectuses. We selected all U.S 
nonconvertible fixed-rate corporate bonds issued between January 1, 1985, and 
December 31, 1999, and with final maturity longer than December 31, 1999. In total, 
we have 6,888 issues (Table 1).  
Information on defaults is from the monthly “Moody’s Default Report”. Our 
sample consists of defaults between January 2000 and December 2002. In total, 76 
companies issuing fixed-rate nonconvertible bonds in our sample defaulted, for a 
total (applying the cross-default hypothesis) of 271 issues.13  
The list of Section 20 banks is from Cornett et al. (2002). In total we have in 
our sample 1,263 issues underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries. Since the first 
issuance was in 1991, in the regression analysis we dropped all bonds issued before 
1991, to avoid any possible bias. Therefore, our sample consists of 5,883 issues; the 
proportion of corporate debt issues underwritten by commercial banks is 21.5 per 
cent (19.3 per cent in dollar terms, showing that the issues underwritten by 
commercial banks are of smaller average size; Table 1). Commercial banks’ share 
                                                     
13 Of course, not all security-issues by the same firm are often underwritten by the same 
syndicate. Missed interest or principal payment made up the majority of defaults. Less frequent 
reasons of default are filing for Chapter 11, filing for bankruptcy, distressed exchange and 
grace period default. 
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rose from 3 per cent in 1991 to 29 per cent in 1995, and then remained substantially 
stable to 1999. 
The average default rate in our sample is 4.3 per cent (5.4 per cent in dollar 
terms, showing that defaulted issues have a larger size than the average). The default 
rate for bonds underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries (3.5 per cent) is lower than 
that for investment houses (4.5 per cent).  
For non-investment-grade bonds the picture is different. We have 1,021 such 
issues in our sample (Table 1), of which 838 were underwritten by investment houses 
(Table 2) and 183 by commercial banks (or 17.9 per cent of the total, which 
compares with 22.4 for investment grade bonds). For non-investment-grade bonds, 
the default rate is higher for commercial banks than for investment houses (10.9 as 
against 6.7 per cent). 
Table 2 reports a complete breakdown of our sample by size, original maturity, 
issuer’s sector of economic activity by SIC codes, and Moody’s credit rating.14 
Commercial banks underwrite a relatively larger share of smaller issues (less than $ 
75 million). As noted above, Panel C shows that on investment-grade issues the 
default rate is higher for investment houses, while on non-investment-grade issues it 
is higher for commercial banks. In Section 6 we present the results of a more formal 
analysis of the default probability of securities issued by investment houses and 
commercial banks. 
                                                     
14 We chose Moody’s credit ratings to be consistent with our source of information on 
corporate defaults. Morgan (2002) shows that disagreements in rating assignments are limited 
in the case of corporate securities. The results of the econometric analysis are confirmed also 
using Standard and Poor’s ratings. 
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6 Regression results 
6.1 Basic specification  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of the basic specification of 
equation (1). Estimates are conducted on a sample of 5,337 security issues, from 
1991 to 1999.15 The regression includes time and industry dummies, as well as the 
issue’s size, gross spread with respect to the benchmark, maturity and rating. 
The hypothesis that security issues underwritten by commercial banks have a 
higher default probability is rejected. The coefficient of the dummy variable for 
issues underwritten by commercial banks is not significantly different from zero. On 
average, the two groups have the same probability of underwriting a security that 
eventually defaulted.  
All the control variables have a significant effect on the probability of default. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that issues with lower ratings, shorter maturities and higher 
interest rate spreads are more likely to default. Interestingly, larger issues also have a 
higher probability of default. This result is not obvious, since the larger issues are 
usually those of larger borrowers, which typically have lower risk. 
Although on average securities underwritten by investment houses and 
commercial banks have the same probability of default, it could be that the two types 
of underwriters have different relative ability to screen certain categories of issues. 
Following Kroszner and Rajan (1994), we try to identify the impact of 
underwriter type on issues of different quality rating by including an interaction term 
                                                     
15 Of the total number of issues in the period (5,883; Table 1), 81 observations are dropped 
because we do not have any defaults for firms with a rating Aaa, and 445 are dropped because 
we do not have defaults for firms with one-digit SIC code 6 (Table 2), i.e. firms operating in 
regulated industries.  
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if a commercial bank underwrites a bond rated below investment-grade.16 This 
alternative specification, reported in Panel B, tells a different story. The coefficient 
of the dummy variable identifying commercial banks is now negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level, but that of the interaction 
term between the dummy for commercial banks and that for non-investment-grade 
securities is positive, significantly different from zero, and twice as large. Panel B 
also shows that the coefficients of the control variables included in the regression are 
virtually unchanged.17 
In summary, non-investment-grade securities underwritten by bank subsidiaries 
have a higher probability of default, while the opposite is true for investment-grade 
securities.  
The same results are obtained considering a more parsimonious specification, 
identical to that adopted by Kroszner and Rajan (1994), where only investment-grade 
and non-investment-grade classes of ratings are included as controls (Table 3, Panel 
C). 
In order to test the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity 
problems that might be present if the interaction term was correlated with the error 
term, we split our sample into two sub-samples and estimate the model in equation 
(1) separately for investment-grade and non-investment-grade issues, excluding 
unrated securities. The results reported in Table 4 confirm the previous findings. 
Investment-grade securities underwritten by commercial banks have a lower 
probability of default than those underwritten by investment houses (although the 
                                                     
16  Unlike Kroszner and Rajan (1994), we cannot estimate the interaction term between bonds 
underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries and unrated bonds, since none of the 7 unrated bonds 
underwritten by subsidiaries defaulted (Table 2). 
17 Our sample includes only issues that defaulted before the end of 2002, although they might 
have had longer maturity. In theory, if securities with longer maturity were all eventually going 
to default, and if commercial banks had underwritten a larger share of defaulting securities 
with shorter maturity, this might introduce a bias in our results. In an unreported regression we 
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coefficient is significantly different from zero only at the 12 per cent level, panel A), 
but the reverse is true in the case of non-investment-grade (the coefficient is 
significant at the 6 per cent level, panel B). Moreover, the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level (panel C). On the contrary, the coefficients of the 
control variables are not significantly different in the two sub-samples.18 
6.2 Duration model 
Table 5 presents the results of the survival-time data model described by equation 
(2). For defaulted bonds, we define the duration as the period from the date of issue 
to the date of default; for non-defaulted bonds, as the period from the date of issue to 
that of repayment. For bonds still performing at December 31, 2002, the end of our 
observation period, we adopt two alternative definitions: in Panel A we define the 
duration as the original maturity (thus implicitly assuming that no bonds defaulted 
after December 31, 2002), in Panel B, as the period from the date of issue to the end 
of our observation period. In the latter case, we control for censoring, namely the 
possibility that some bonds might have defaulted after December 31, 2002.19 Both 
regressions include as control variables calendar year, issue’s maturity, rating, size 
and gross spread with respect to the benchmark, and a dummy for the issuer’s 
industry.20 
The results of Panel A show that the coefficient of the dummy for investment-
grade securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries is negative, but not 
                                                                                                                                           
have concentrated on issues with maturity between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002, 
finding that our results are, if anything, stronger than for the entire sample.  
18 In unreported regressions, we also re-estimated equation (1) for the two sub-samples, 
excluding rating dummies from the explanatory variables; the results are unchanged. 
19 Although this was indeed a possibility, we know that defaults have been very rare in 2003 
and, so far, in 2004. 
20 The total number of observations is lower than that used in the basic specification because 
the information needed for the estimation of the survival time data model are not available for 
all securities.  
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significantly different from zero. The coefficient of the dummy for non-investment-
grade securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 10 per cent level. At each point in time, non-investment-
grade securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries are then more likely to 
default within one period than those underwritten by investment banks. This evidence 
is a confirmation of the results obtained with the basic specification. 
The results in Panel B are similar to those of Panel A. Although the 
coefficients of the dummies for securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries are 
never significantly different from zero, their sign is unchanged and, most important, 
the difference between the two remains statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
6.3 Propensity score matching 
Table 6 reports the results obtained using the propensity score matching method, 
where the matching sample is constructed choosing the nearest neighbors.21  
Panel A shows that the ‘average treatment on the treated’ effect (ATT) for 
securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries (the column labeled ‘treated’), and 
by investment banks (‘controls’) are substantially identical. Similar results are 
obtained for investment-grade securities (panel B). However, for non-investment-
grade securities (panel C), ATT for ‘treated’ observations is equal to 0.11, more than 
double that for the control sample (0.05). Moreover, the difference between the two 
effects is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.22 
The results obtained with alternative statistical methodologies lend therefore 
support to those of the basic specification. 
                                                     
21 We found similar results using the kernel weights method suggested by Heckman et al. 
(1997). 
22 Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions and significance by 
using the bias-corrected confidence interval. 
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7 Discussion and robustness checks 
Kroszner and Rajan show “that affiliate-underwritten issues defaulted statistically 
significantly less often than ex ante similar investment-bank-underwritten-issues. The 
differences in default rates are greatest for the non-investment-grade issues. Clearly, 
this refutes the naïve-investor hypothesis, which would suggest significantly higher 
default rates among affiliate-originated bonds, especially for low quality issues”.23  
Our own results tell quite a different story. After controlling for bonds’ 
characteristics, such as ratings and interest rates, we find indeed that high quality 
issues underwritten by commercial banks have a lower default rate than on those 
underwritten by investment houses. However, we also find that low quality issues 
underwritten by commercial banks have a higher default rate than those underwritten 
by investment houses. Based on this latter result, it is not possible to refute the ‘naïve 
investor’ hypothesis. However, before drawing any conclusion on this issue, we 
discuss in detail two alternative explanations of our results, not directly related to 
conflicts of interest.  
7.1 Rating attribution 
The first alternative explanation of the higher default rate on lower quality issues 
underwritten by commercial banks is that the ratings assigned to bank-originated 
securities were systematically different from those of bonds underwritten by 
investment houses. This might happen for two different reasons. On the one hand, if 
rating agencies were unable to gather all the information necessary to discriminate 
between different securities, while they rationally expected that some commercial 
banks might misrepresent the issues’ quality, they would tend to assign an inferior 
rating to bonds originated by commercial banks. In other words, rating agencies 
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would apply a ‘lemon’ discount, as noted by Kroszner and Rajan (1994). 
Alternatively, agencies might assign better ratings to securities underwritten by 
Section 20 subsidiaries because they – and the market – believe that on average 
commercial banks have private information on the issuer that permits better 
assessment of the risk (the certification effect). 
While a ‘lemon’ discount on Section-20-originated issues would not imply a 
bias against our results, this does not hold if there is a systematic difference in rating 
assignments due to the certification effect.24 Under this second hypothesis, Section-
20-originated securities would be assigned better ratings than those originated by 
investment houses. Non-investment-grade issues underwritten by commercial banks 
would then be of lower quality and, as such, would have a higher default rate as we 
found in our empirical analysis. Although this hypothesis still implies a 
misperception by the rating agencies – and the market – on the riskiness of bank-
originated securities, it would also imply that our results offer no indication 
concerning the existence of conflicts of interest in the underwriting business. 
To test the hypothesis that our findings were driven by a systematic bias in 
ratings attribution, we split the sample on the basis of an alternative measure of 
riskiness, the bonds’ yields, and verified whether we obtained different results. In 
order to do so, we ranked the securities in our sample with respect to their spread 
over the benchmark, and we split it at 210 basis points (in proximity of the 
observation with a position equal to the number of investment-grade securities).25 
                                                                                                                                           
23  Kroszner and Rajan (1994), pp. 819-820. 
24 In presence of a ‘lemons market’ discount, affiliate-originated issues would be 
systematically rated lower than issues underwritten by commercial banks and therefore, within 
each rating class, they should have on average a lower probability of default (see Kroszner and 
Rajan, 1994, pp. 822-823). 
25 The purpose of this procedure was to obtain two samples of size comparable to that of 
investment-grade and non-investment-grade securities. Although ratings are one of the major 
determinants of the spread over the benchmark, we found 182 securities rated non-investment-
grade for which the spread over the benchmark was below the splitting value. 
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Table 7 replicates table 4, but splitting the sample between high-yield on and 
low-yield securities, as described above. Panel A shows that the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for investment-grade commercial banks’ issues is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level, implying that on average 
bank-originated issues have a lower probability of default. Once again, the reverse is 
true in the case of non-investment-grade securities (the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level, panel B). Moreover, the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level (panel C).26 
The evidence is therefore against the hypothesis that our results are due to a 
bias in rating assignments. 
7.2 Entry 
A second possible explanation of the higher default rate for lower-quality bonds 
underwritten by commercial banks is that in order to gain access to the underwriting 
market, Section 20 subsidiaries initially concentrated on riskier issues – for which 
there was less competition from investment houses – and only later began to offer 
their services to safer issuers as well. For example, banks might have started giving 
access to the bond market to smaller and riskier issuers that had previously been 
excluded (Gande et al., 1999). 
According to this explanation, the difference in the default probability should 
have been greater for bonds issued in the first half of the Nineties than for those 
issued later on. To test this hypothesis, we split our sample into two sub-samples, 
1991-1995 and 1996-1999. The results, reported in Table 8, show that neither for 
investment-grade securities (Panel B) nor for non-investment-grade securities (Panel 
                                                     
26 In additional, unreported, regressions we verified that our results are also confirmed: a) 
using Standard and Poor ratings; and b) artificially classifying each bank underwritten security 
rated Ba1-Ba3 as Baa1-Baa3, as it would be the case of rating agencies believed in the 
‘certification hypothesis’. 
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C) does the coefficient of the dummy variable for commercial banks differ 
significantly in the two sub-periods.27 Thus the data reject the hypothesis that the 
higher default rate on bonds underwritten by commercial banks’ subsidiaries for 
lower quality securities depends on an aggressive entry strategy. 
8 Conclusions 
This paper presents some new empirical evidence on the conflict of interest implicit 
in banks underwriting corporate securities and selling them to their customers. We 
compare the rates of default for securities issued by investment houses and by 
commercial banks in the Nineties. Two alternative views are confronted: a) that 
commercial banks might convert loans to firms in financial difficulties into bonds 
marketed to unsuspecting clients (the ‘naïve investor’ hypothesis); and b) that 
commercial banks possess private information on the financial condition of their 
clients and so perform better screening (the certification hypothesis). 
The empirical analysis consists in calculating the default probability in the 
years 2000-2002 of more than 5,000 security issues underwritten by U.S. investment 
houses or commercial banks between 1991 and 1999. On average, the probability of 
underwriting a security that eventually defaulted was equal in the two groups. 
However, studying riskier and less risky securities separately – splitting the sample 
between investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds – higher quality issues 
underwritten by banks have a lower probability of default than those underwritten by 
investment houses, while the reverse is true for lower quality issues. 
Two explanations of our results not related to conflicts of interest are 
considered. First, rating agencies might be systematically assigning better ratings to 
the bank-underwritten bonds, recognizing their greater certification ability. We 
                                                     
27 Similar results are obtained considering two sub-samples of bonds issued in 1991-1994 and 
in 1995-1999. 
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therefore use a different measure of riskiness based on bonds’ yield. Also in this case 
– splitting the sample between low-yield and high-yield bonds – lower quality issues 
underwritten by commercial banks had a higher probability of default, confirming our 
previous results. The second alternative we considered was that the greater riskiness 
of the lower quality issues originated by banks stemmed from a strategy for entry into 
the underwriting market. This interpretation is also rejected by the data. 
The result that lower quality bonds underwritten by commercial banks 
defaulted more frequently than those underwritten by investment houses – partially in 
contrast with the findings of the studies on the pre-Glass-Steagall period – doesn’t 
allow us to refute the ‘naïve investor’ hypothesis. At the same time, our analysis does 
not suffice to claim that commercial banks have been abusing their private 
information, since we do not control whether there was a lending relationship 
between the defaulting borrowers and the underwriting banks. Moreover, it is likely 
that the costs of the additional defaults are lower than the benefits of the larger and 
more competitive market favored by the entry of commercial banks in the 
underwriting business, as shown by Gande et al. (1999). Still, one may expect that 
market participants will adapt their future behavior, rationally accounting for the 
differences in default probabilities that showed up during the first severe downturn 
since the liberalization of the underwriting business. 
Table 1  
Number and Volume of Securities Issued by Year,  
by Type of Underwriter and by Default 
The table gives the number and the total values of the securities in our sample – issued between January 1, 1991 and 
December 31, 1999 and with maturity longer than December 31, 1999 – distinguishing those that defaulted between 
January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002, and those underwritten by investment houses and by commercial banks. Data 
on security issues are from Security Data Corporation, defaults are from Moody’s Default Report. Investment-grade ratings 
are those classified by Moody’s between Aaa and Baa3. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in 
Cornett et al. (2002). 
 
Total market  
Market Share of 
Bank 
Underwritings 
 Default Rate 
       Investment Houses  Banks 
 Number 
of issues 
Amount 
(m$) 
 Number 
of issues
Amount 
(m$) 
 Numb.
issues 
Amou. 
(m$) 
 Num. 
iss. 
Amou. 
(m$) 
 
Panel A: Total Securities Issued 
 
1985 139 17816     5.8 8.5    
1986 302 46392     4.0 5.0    
1987 148 22109     4.1 6.6    
1988 130 23008     3.8 4.8    
1989 143 28739     2.8 1.9    
1990 163 25185     3.1 3.2    
1991 344 59915  3.2 2.5  8.7 5.9  9.1 11.9 
1992 585 97580  5.5 4.8  4.2 4.7  3.1 3.2 
1993 919 148674  11.4 9.6  4.5 5.7  2.9 6.5 
1994 336 54130  20.8 18.9  4.1 4.9  7.1 8.6 
1995 574 91163  29.8 21.2  5.5 4.0  0.6 1.0 
1996 599 98763  29.7 25.0  2.6 3.1  2.8 4.5 
1997 734 103765  28.1 23.1  4.9 7.8  1.9 1.7 
1998 1057 182868  27.9 24.8  3.5 7.8  4.4 4.4 
1999 715 150615  27.3 30.8  4.0 5.3  5.6 5.4 
            
85-99 6888 1150723     4.4 5.5    
            
85-90 1025 163250     3.9 4.7    
91-99 5863 987474  21.5 19.3  4.5 5.7  3.5 4.4 
            
 
Panel B: Investment Grade Securities 
 
85-90 864 128081     4.3 5.4    
91-99 4788 778897  22.4 20.0  4.0 5.1  2.2 2.7 
            
 
Panel C: Non Investment Grade Securities 
 
85-90 145 34727     2.1 2.3    
91-99 1021 204579  17.9 16.5  6.7 7.8  10.9 12.3 
            
Table 2 
Securities Issued by Type of Underwriter, by Size, by Maturity, by Industry and by Rating 
The table classifies the number and the total values of the securities in our sample – issued between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 1999, and with maturity 
longer than December 31, 1999 – distinguishing those that defaulted between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002, and those underwritten by investment 
houses and by commercial banks, with a breakdown by size, original maturity, issuer’s sector of economic activity by SIC codes, Moody’s credit ratings. Data on 
security issues are from Security Data Corporation, defaults are from Moody’s Default Report. Investment-grade ratings are those classified by Moody’s between 
Aaa and Baa3. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). 
Panel A: Investment House Issues Panel B: Bank Issues Panel C: Default rate  
Non-Defaulted Issues Defaulted Issues Non-Defaulted Issues Defaulted Issues Investment  Houses Banks 
Breakdown 
Number Amount 
 (m$) 
Number Amount 
(m$) 
Number Amount 
 (m$) 
Number Amount 
(m$) 
Number Number 
Total 4393 171 207 218 1219 149 44 190 4.5 3.5 
           
Size           
Greater than $300m 445 560 35 586 132 563 8 417 7.3 5.7 
$75m to $300m 2775 167 128 180 585 166 25 187 4.4 4.1 
Less than $75m 1173 33 44 36 502 21 11 31 3.6 2.1 
Maturity           
Less than 5 years 174 103 24 160 78 99 9 36 12.1 10.3 
5 to 15 years 2494 172 103 249 754 158 24 215 4.0 3.1 
Over 15 years 1725 176 80 195 387 144 11 262 4.4 2.8 
Industry           
0 14 125 5 195 7 95 26.3   
1 274 184 15 314 96 171 5 220 5.2 5.0 
2 682 204 4 169 219 160 7 214 0.6 3.1 
3 530 201 22 172 222 162 7 224 4.0 3.1 
4 1914 162 87 276 343 147 9 279 4.3 2.6 
5 330 194 35 160 91 190 6 214 9.6 6.2 
6 313 81 132 52   
7 259 154 31 139 96 190 10 41 10.7 9.4 
8 77 178 8 140 13 94 9.4   
Rating           
Aaa 76 229 5 275  
Aa1- Aa3 512 189 9 200 82 172 1.7
A1- A3 1529 157 28 237 470 132 4 396 1.8 0.8 
Baa1- Baa3 1451 164 110 210 492 150 20 132 7.0 3.9 
Ba1- Ba3 363 213 17 287 63 195 9 196 4.5 12.5 
B1- B3 406 193 35 226 98 175 11 216 7.9 10.1 
Caa1- Caa2 13 122 4 153 2 93 23.5  
Not Rated/Available 43 66 4 56 7 131 8.5
  
  
Table 3  
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults – Logit Model 
The table presents the results of logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by 
investment houses and commercial banks (equation 1 in the text). The dependent variable is a dummy (1 if the 
security defaults between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002). The regressions include time and industry 
dummies (not reported). Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Investment-grade issues are 
those classified between Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 
subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies 
(not reported). White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** 
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.   
 Panel A:   Panel B:   Panel C: 
Variables With no 
interactions 
 With interactions  à la Kroszner and 
Rajan  
Bank Underwriting -0.112   -0.544 *  -0.466 * 
 (0.217)  (0.282)   (0.276)  
Non-Investment Grade    -0.438   
    (0.381)  
Unrated -0.623    0.162   
 (0.843)    (0.785)  
Bank*Non-Investment Grade  1.269 ***  1.144 ** 
  (0.446)   (0.444)  
Size (log value) 0.267 *** 0.278 ***  0.329 *** 
 (0.074)  (0.076)   (0.075)  
Gross spread 0.002 *** 0.002 **  0.004 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  
   
No. of  Observations 5,337 5,333  5,414 
R-Square 0.155 0.161  0.118 
 
   
 
  
Table 4 
 
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults – Logit Model 
(sample split between investement and non-investment grade securities) 
The table presents the results of logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by 
investment houses and commercial banks (equation 1 in the text), splitting the sample between investment-grade and 
non-investment-grade issues. The dependent variable is a dummy (1 if the security defaults between January 1, 
2000, and December 31, 2002). The regressions include maturity, time, rating and industry dummies (not reported). 
Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Investment-grade issues are those classified between 
Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et 
al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies (not reported). White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level 
of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
 
 Panel A:   Panel B:   Panel C: 
Variables Investment Grade  Non-Investment 
Grade 
 Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -0.463   0.660 **  6.25 ** 
 (0.301)  (0.331)    
Size (log value) 0.298 *** 0.351 *  0.06  
 (0.094)  (0.199)    
Gross spread 0.005 ** 0.002    1.58  
 (0.002)  (0.001)    
   
No. of  Observations 4,269 993   
R-Square 0.229 0.126   
  
 
  
Table 5 
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults - Duration Model 
(sample split between investement and non-investment grade securities) 
 
The table presents the results of a survival-time data model by the method of proportional hazards regression 
(equation 2 in the text), splitting the sample between investment-grade and non-investment-grade issues. The 
dependent variable is the ‘baseline’ hazard based on the duration measured in months. For a defaulted bond the 
duration is the period from the issue date to the date of default. For an undefaulted bond the duration is the period 
from the issue date to the date of repayment. For performing bonds at the December 31, 2002 (the end of our 
observation period), in Panel A we define the duration as equal to the the original maturity (thus assuming no other 
default after the end of our observation period), while in Panel B we define the duration as the period from issue 
date to December, 31 2002 (thus controlling for censoring). Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 
and 2. Investment-grade issues are those classified between Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings are 
those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, 
industry and rating dummies (not reported). White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * 
between 5 and 10 per cent.  
 
 Panel A:  For performing bonds at Dec, 31 2002,  
the duration is equal to the original maturity 
Variables Investment Grade  Non-Investment 
Grade 
 Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -0.423   0.613 *  6.14 ** 
 (0.271)  (0.319)    
Size (log value) 0.240 *** 0.336 *  0.18  
 (0.078)  (0.195)    
Gross spread 0.004 *** 0.002    1.23  
 (0.001)  (0.001)    
   
No. of  Observations 4,588 1,012   
R-Square   
 
 Panel B: For performing bonds at Dec, 31 2002, 
the duration is equal to the period from issue date to Dec, 31 2002 
Variables Investment Grade  Non-Investment 
Grade 
 Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -0.413   0.487    5.71 ** 
 (0.267)  (0.340)    
Size (log value) 0.275 *** 0.190    0.21  
 (0.067)  (0.162)    
Gross spread 0.003 ** 0.002 **  0.34  
 (0.001)  (0.001)    
   
No. of  Observations 4,788 1,021   
R-Square   
 
  
Table 6 
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults – Matching Model 
 
The table presents the results of a matching logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten 
by investment houses and commercial banks (equation 3 in the text), splitting the sample by year of issue. The 
routine we used for estimations is PSMATCH2, a Stata module by Leuven and Sianesi. (2003). The dependent 
variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the security defaults between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002. 
Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Investment-grade issues are those classified between 
Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings (“treated” observations) are those by one of the Section 20 
subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies 
(not reported). Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are computed by bootstrapping, with 200 repetitions. The 
symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per 
cent (significance is computed by using the bias-corrected confidence interval). 
 
Panel A: All Securities 
Variables Treated  Controls  Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated 0.035  0.033   0.002  
    (0.010)  
   
No. of  Obs. (common support) 1,240 4,524   
No. of  Observations 1,263 4,600   
 
Panel B: Investment-Grade Securities 
Variables Treated  Controls  Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated 0.023   0.024    -0.001  
    (0.009)  
   
No. of  Obs. (common support) 1,061 3,648  
No. of  Observations 1,073 3,715  
 
Panel C: Non-Investment-Grade Securities 
Variables Treated  Controls  Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated 0.110   0.049   0.060 ** 
    (0.037)  
   
No. of  Obs. (common support) 182 739   
No. of  Observations 183 797   
 
  
Table 7 
 
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults – Logit Model 
(sample split between high-yield and low-yield securities) 
The table presents the results of logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by 
investment houses and commercial banks (equation 1 in the text), splitting the sample between high-yield and low-
yield securities. The dependent variable is a dummy (1 if the security defaults between January 1, 2000, and 
December 31, 2002). Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Investment-grade issues are those 
classified between Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries 
listed in Cornett et al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies (not 
reported). White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** 
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent 
 Panel A:   Panel B:   Panel C: 
Variables Low-Yield 
Securities 
(spread over 
benchmark either 
lower than or 
equal to 210 bp) 
 High-Yield 
Securities 
(spread over 
benchmark higher 
than 210 bp) 
 Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -0.539 ** 0.674 **  7.64 *** 
 (0.261)  (0.326)    
Size (log value) 0.306 *** 0.218    0.23  
 (0.061)  (0.164)    
Gross spread 0.004 * 0.002    0.63  
 (0.003)  (0.001)    
   
No. of  Observations 4,316 970   
R-Square 0.206 0.160   
 
 
  
 
Table 8 
Effect of Market Entry on Security Defaults 
The table presents the results of logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by 
investment houses and commercial banks (equation 1 in the text), splitting the sample by year of issue. The 
dependent variable is a dummy (1 if the security defaults between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002). 
Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Investment-grade issues are those classified between 
Aaa and Baa3 by Moody’s. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et 
al. (2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies (not reported). White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level 
of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
Panel A: All Securities 
Variables 1991-95  1996-1999  Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -0.300   0.002    0.35  
 (0.421)  (0.286)    
Size (log value) 0.470 *** 0.251 ***  1.69  
 (0.140)  (0.094)    
Gross spread 0.004 *** 0.003 **  0.22  
 (0.001)  (0.002)    
   
No. of  Observations 2,637 2,443   
R-Square 0.132 0.245   
 
Panel B: Investment-Grade Securities 
Variables 1991-95  1996-1999  Difference test 
Bank Underwriting -1.364   -0.338    0.80  
 (1.088)  (0.353)    
Size (log value) 0.605 *** 0.251 **  2.72 * 
 (0.182)  (0.113)    
Gross spread 0.010 *** 0.004    1.73  
 (0.003)  (0.003)    
   
No. of  Observations 2,003 2,037   
R-Square 0.239 0.283   
 
Panel C: Non-Investment-Grade Securities 
Variables 1991-95  1996-1999  Difference test 
Bank Underwriting 0.326   1.157 **  1.60  
 (0.474)  (0.526)    
Size (log value) 0.210   0.495    0.67  
 (0.279)  (0.335)    
Gross spread 0.002   0.003    0.01  
 (0.002)  (0.002)    
   
No. of  Observations 519 281   
R-Square 0.097 0.212   
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